Update the biosecurity statements repository
AI biology tools (protein design, CRISPR design and more) sometimes publish biosecurity statements. Add new tools to the repository and compare what they promise.
What should happen when someone discovers that a new tool could break existing defences, such as evading DNA screening? Draft a responsible-disclosure framework.
Status: Likely to be picked up by IBBIS in 2026. Check with them first.
Dual-use risk. Some biosecurity work can be misused. Work with an experienced mentor, keep anything you publish high-level, and ask before sharing detailed material.
Cybersecurity and medical devices have mature disclosure norms; biology mostly does not. A clear process protects good-faith reporters and the public.
Output: A framework document comparing models and recommending one.
Pick a decision-maker and a decision they actually face.
Gather the facts: what exists, what is proposed, who disagrees.
Lay out 2–3 realistic options with their pros and cons.
Recommend one, and say what evidence would change your mind.
Keep it to two pages and get feedback from someone who disagrees.
All steps done
Share what you made, then try another project. The PDF version has room for notes.
AI biology tools (protein design, CRISPR design and more) sometimes publish biosecurity statements. Add new tools to the repository and compare what they promise.
Companies make synthetic DNA to order. Screening those orders and the customers who place them is one of the main defences against engineered pandemics. Explain how it works and where the gaps are.
Expand a handful of existing case studies into 25–40 profiles of legitimate and concerning customers, including historical cases of people who ordered dangerous biological material.